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Abstract 
This article aims to shed light on the evaluation of public policies designed to incentivize 
partnering between municipalities. The increasing use of interorganisational arrangements to 
implement public programs poses yet another challenge for public managers and academics: 
that of developing an evaluation method for these initiatives. The variety of intermunicipal 
arrangements implemented in Lombardy analysed and reported in this article highlights the 
influence of policy incentives on the capacity to create and maintain collaborative efforts in 
the context of local development. Our qualitative study extends the evaluation research on 
implementation but reaches mixed conclusions on what makes associative forms effective. 
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1. Introduction 
The past 20 years have marked progressive advances in the development of innovative 
methods to deliver public services and to satisfy public functions and needs, especially at the 
local level. While the results of this new phase of the change process, embarked on by Italy’s 
public administration in the early 1990s, have yet to come to light generally, we can identify 
some common traits. First, the emphasis on the local dimension emerges clearly. We are 
dealing with policies in which the local area is not only the place where the programs are 
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implemented, but also the main reference point for the design and implementation of new 
policies. The launch of the Local Intervention Plans in 1997 and the District Plans in 2000 are 
an example of this. Second, the policymaking process encompasses diverse institutional levels 
– from the European Union and the Member States to the regions and the individual 
municipalities. Third, the decision-making process involves a multitude of subjects, also 
private, embedded within networks of interconnected relationships. ‘Network’ is one of the 
terms used most to define these conglomerates of connections (other very common labels 
include: joined-up government, intermunicipal or interorganisational arrangements, service 
delivery partnerships, shared provision, inter-local agreements).  
Several years after the first organic attempts at reform and despite an awareness of the results 
achieved, above all, at the local administration level, the common perception of the 
functioning of the public sector does not appear improved, in fact, it is still seen as a largely 
inefficient structure, perpetually over-stretched when it comes to meeting the needs of the 
collective (Martin, 2002; Morciano, 2008). On the other hand, the few success stories 
reported do not help to significantly raise the quality of a system that – in Italy – comprises 
almost 10,000 independent agencies – among which 223 central and 130 regional and 
provincial administrations, 8,101 municipalities, and 358 mountain communities – and that 
finds it hard to operate as an integrated or “network-like” system. 
This paper is interested in understanding whether the publicly funded initiatives launched by 
Italy’s regional administrations to incentivize the development of local communities and to 
encourage the implementation of shared solutions to complex problems (Mandell and 
Steelman, 2003) have helped to solve questions previously reserved for government 
intervention. These issues are viewed from a perspective that we believe has generally been 
under-researched and seldom studied empirically (Horelli, 2009; Hudson, 2004) compared 
with the dyadic relationships dealt with by the mainstream. Specifically, the analysis focuses 
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on the network rather than the organisational level of interorganisational arrangements, what 
many academics (e.g. Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Provan, Fish, and Sydow, 2007; Rodriguez, 
Langley, Denis, and Béland, 2007) call focusing on the “whole network”. Another reason for 
our study is the acknowledgement that evaluating partnerships is complicated (Pope and 
Lewis, 2008) but necessary because networks are crucial institutional settings for the 
implementation of public programs (O'Toole, 1993; O'Toole, 1997a). Only by examining the 
whole network can we understand how collective outcomes might be generated (Provan et al., 
2007). This point has special relevance for policy planners and those whose perspective goes 
beyond the performance of individual organisations. For instance, an analysis of whole 
networks can facilitate our understanding of how collaborative arrangements can improve the 
provision of a particular service and how publicly funded health and human services can be 
delivered more effectively to local communities (May and Winter, 2007).  
Two key assumptions underpin collaborative arrangements and, thus, the policies that seek to 
persuade the local councils to favor and adopt these organisational forms. The first 
assumption is that they enhance the overall effectiveness of the service provided as the 
combined result of higher efficiency (thanks to a more rational use of resources), the fostering 
of innovation, and increasing flexibility. The second is that, on balance, collaboration leads to 
better service outcomes (May and Winter, 2007) because it facilitates access to rich, localized 
information and expertise (Huang and Provan, 2007; Hudson, 2004; O'Toole, 1997b; Provan 
and Milward, 2001). 
At present, the studies that have sought to empirically analyze the role of collaborative 
arrangements (Babiak, 2009; Fedele and Moini, 2006; Hudson, 2004) in implementing 
national or regional policies reveal a very mixed bag of situations and outcomes. Since many 
network linkages are voluntary and self-regulating, they may lack stability (Huang and 
Provan, 2007). Further, the projects implemented by the administrations are not always 
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coherent with the criteria that inspire the incentive policies. In our opinion, all these factors 
bolster the hypothesis that the gap between the regulatory principles and effective 
implementation is mainly due to an inability to concretize the change within and among the 
participating organisations.  
This exploratory paper presents the core evaluation concepts of regional policies that aim at 
promote local development and an empirical case to enable us to discuss the implications of 
the intermunicipal programs implemented in Lombardy. In summary, our research questions 
are:  
1. Has the promotion of intermunicipal arrangements increased collaboration among the 
public administrations?  
2. Is it possible to perform an evaluation of the incentive policies outside the 
policymaking arena, i.e. an evaluation not influenced by vested party interests? 
 
The following analysis mainly harnesses the contribution of organisational studies and policy 
studies. We believe that analyzing the organisational underpinnings of program 
implementation means focusing our interest on both the content of the intended programs and 
how to establish and maintain a viable organisation to implement the program elements 
(Scheirer, 1996) italics in the original text). In addition, alliances among communities require 
new types of interactions, purposes, operations, and agreements – all increasing the 
complexity of organisational purpose (Cigler, 1999). Policy studies are an indispensable 
reference point to understand the logic underlying the processes that translate the decision of 
the policymakers into a final result, i.e. outputs, outcomes and impacts (Regonini, 2001). 
Implementation demands the efforts of the whole of the public administrations, from the top 
down to the street-level bureaucrats. In that sense, it represents the ‘moment of truth’ (Majone 
and Wildavsky, 1984).  
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In the following section, we briefly describe Stoker’s IRF (Implementation Regime 
Framework) model (Stoker, 1989), an approach designed to holistically analyze the 
interorganisational (multi-agency) implementation of public policies. After which we will 
describe the case of the intermunicipal partnerships developed in Lombardy on the back of the 
incentive policies launched by the regional administration. We will then comment on the case 
and close with some reflections on the implications inherent the use of the IRF in the 
implementation evaluation activity. 
2. Analyzing Implementation  
The problem of converting policy intention into action consists of two components: getting 
those who are to carry out the mandate to execute in accord with its dictates, and assuring that 
the effects of these actions on the ultimate target are the ones desired, defined as what 
happens between the establishment of a governmental intention and the consequent impact 
(O'Toole, 1983). While the success of a policy depends on the accomplishment of both those 
components, this paper focuses solely on the former, or what is generally defined as 
implementation. 
Many scholars have addressed this theme over the years, adopting diversified theoretical 
perspectives and approaches. In this section, more than an exhaustive review of the relevant 
literature – even though, for clarity of presentation, the following sections will refer to the 
basic traits of the two most-diffused interpretive keys offered by policy studies, i.e. Policy 
Evaluation and Policy Inquiry – we intend to shed light on the usefulness of a theoretical 
approach that can help us to enhance our understanding of interorganisational 
implementation. Therefore, we will refer to the main contents of the theory called the 
Implementation Regime Framework (IRF) proposed by Stoker in 1989 (Stoker, 1989), which, 
unexplainably in our opinion, contemporary studies seem to have overlooked.  
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2.1 Policy Evaluation vs. Policy Inquiry 
Policy evaluation is an obligatory point of reference in responding to any questions that might 
arise during the formulation of a public policy, the drafting of new plans, and to test the 
efficacy and efficiency of implemented and future projects. The key judgment criteria is that 
of the achievement of the objectives of the interventions and the degree of congruency 
between the performance obtained and the preset goals.  
Studies inspired by Policy evaluation say that the purpose of implementation is to generate the 
policy outputs desired by policy formulators with efficiency and fidelity (Stoker, 1989). On 
the intergovernmental level, implementation is problematic because opportunities for 
distortion of federal policy formulators’ intention are created. Deviation from the policy 
formulators’ vision is dysfunctional behaviour that must be prevented (through suitable 
plans), minimized and surpassed by special fixers. Two alternative strategies can be applied 
by each implementation actor, depending on their preferences: (1) cooperate with the proposal 
that has been passed down from the preceding implementation participant, or (2) veto the 
initiative. The decision in either direction (i.e. cooperation or defection) depends on the extent 
to which the implementation participants are in conflict with the aims of the policy in 
question.  
The main benefit of Policy Evaluation is the clarity of its assumptions. Further, Policy 
Evaluation makes its own distinction between policy design and policy implementation, 
setting out a clear boundary between the two phases.  
The most orthodox version of Policy Evaluation is the target for a branch of studies and 
proposals (called Policy Inquiry) that advance strong doubts about both the underlying 
assumptions and the concrete practicality. For example, Policy Evaluation is criticized for 
urging that the implementation process be planned or its claim that policy formulation is when 
the seeds of social conflict are sown. 
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The studies inspired by Policy Inquiry consider implementation as a bargaining game in 
which well-positioned interests compete for control of the program. Policy outputs are created 
by the interaction of implementation participants and are beyond the control of any single 
participant. 
To evaluate implementation according to the Policy Inquiry approach, we need to first 
describe the strategic context created by the policy initiatives. Unfortunately, according to the 
critics, this model lacks clear standards to judge implementation performance.  
2.2 Implementation Regime Framework 
The interpretive model known as the Implementation Regime Framework, IRF (Stoker, 
1989), suggests a conceptual alternative to the implementation problem versus the competing 
approaches proposed by the main branches of study just mentioned. This theoretical proposal 
places the emphasis on the relationship between implementation and the context within which 
the implementation occurs. The notion of regime refers to institutions that embody principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge” 
(ibidem: 37). At the organisational level, a regime is ‘a system of rules, norms, and 
procedures that governs the participants to some collective decision’ (ibidem: 30). 
In the context of multi-level governance, an implementation regime can promote cooperation 
by providing a setting in which relationships are more predictable (Cline, 2000). The IRF 
conceives implementation as a task which creates a context that will induce the participants to 
cooperate in the presence of conflict of interest. Thus to determine the success of the 
implementation process, one must examine the strategic and institutional context that make up 
a particular regime (ibidem: 556).  
The IRF recognizes the importance of the heuristic contribution offered by policy studies, but 
attributes a predominant weighting to the problem of the governance of the implementation. 
In particular, the IRF agrees with the top-down approaches of placing the emphasis on the 
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cooperation and defection strategies, but differs from these in at least two aspects: first, it 
seeks to understand the ways in which cooperation and accommodation can be achieved in a 
mixed motive context (Stoker, 1989): Why are some mixed motive conflicts resolved through 
cooperation while others end in stagnation? How can implementers create a context in which 
constructive patterns of cooperation are likely to emerge (ibidem: 38). The second distinctive 
aspect, compared with the top-down approaches, is that the IRF considers the implementation 
as a process that develops over time and which influences the overall order of the decisional 
processes set up by various implementation participants. IRF recognizes that implementation 
is most difficult in the initial period as the likelihood of defection and stagnation from mutual 
defection is greatest (ibidem: 39), but this tendency is self-correcting over time: as the 
implementation regime more fully develops, cooperation and mutual adaptation become more 
likely. Consequently, a realistic assessment of the potential for public initiatives requires a 
longer view with a keen eye for the possibility of reform.   
3. Research methodology 
Three main reasons prompted us to choose the Lombardy Region case: i) this region (along 
with Piedmont and Veneto) has the highest level of micro-municipalities and institutionally 
fragmented local agencies. In fact, the small municipalities (with less than 3,000 residents) 
make up more than half the Lombard municipalities; ii) the whole networks implemented in 
Lombardy are cases familiar to both authors. In particular, one of the authors participated in a 
work group set up by the Lombard Regional Council to report on the status of the associative 
forms between the local agencies. The work group produced a survey, published in July 2009 
(IReR, 2009), highly original also for the national context (since no picture of the extent of 
the local partnerships present in Italy existed at the time of writing), that snapshots the 
functions carried out by the 1,460 municipalities of Lombardy, either autonomously or in 
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association with other agencies; and iii) the fact that the experiences analyzed are still 
ongoing and, therefore, enable the carrying out of an in itinere (i.e. continuous) assessment, 
that is, an evidence-based evaluation that seeks to account for what happens as the 
implementation of the policy unfolds. According to Lippi (2007), this type of evaluation 
offers the most interesting results in terms of “cognitive whole” (ibidem: 121). In other words, 
when public actors appointed to the role of agenda setter, decision-maker and implementer 
belong to three different institutional levels (like in the case of the incentive policies promoted 
by the regional administrations), we are looking at a situation of maximum cognitive deficit in 
which none of these actors have any facts on what the others are doing. The in itinere 
evaluation is a way of placing the policymakers in a position to strategically read the reality, 
taking into account not only the policy outcomes, but also the processes that have generated 
these.  
We used a qualitative research design (Lee, 1999) to enable us to describe, interpret and 
explain a situation about which we are not fully knowledgeable as well as identify new 
managerial actions (ibidem: 38). 
The main source of information for this study was the data harvested for the IReR 2009 
survey. Data collection took place from December 2008 to March 2009. Semi-structured 
interviews, averaging about 2.5 hours each, with experts (i.e. 17 Lombard public 
administrators who had participated in experiences of associated management) enabled us to 
corroborate the main findings. Our study methodology included triangulating the data through 
interviews and documentation (e.g. minutes, reports, and other written materials). A recent 
study (Babiak, 2009) dedicated to the evaluation of multiple cross-sector relationships 
prompted us to use both deductive and inductive reasoning in analyzing these data. In terms 
of the level of the analysis, we adopted an interorganisational perspective (Mercurio and 
Testa, 2000). Therefore, this paper considers whole networks throughout.  
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4. Empirical evidence 
4.1 Collaboration between municipal administrations in Lombardy 
The associative forms between municipal administrations are based on collaborative 
processes aimed at producing public value through the joint provision of administrative 
products, deeds, and services. The collaborative level of an associative form is defined by the 
extent to which the resources and the responsibilities taken on jointly to offer administrative 
products, deeds, and services are shared. Associative forms can take different legal 
personalities. 
Firstly, the collaboration may concern the whole product development cycle - from the 
strategic definition of the objectives to the allocation of the resources and the regulation of the 
activities and relations with both the users - and the provision of local community services 
with joint responsibility. We define this type of collaborative form as the associated 
management of service. It can be launched voluntarily, when the local administrations 
autonomously decide to manage the services in an associated way, or cogently, when a 
normative obligation exists for the associated management.  
Secondly, the collaboration can be oriented exclusively to the strategic definition of the 
objectives, the allocation and distribution of the resources among the subjects involved, and 
the regulation of the activities and relations with the users of the services. In this case, the 
collaboration excludes the provision of services in which the administrative products are 
owned jointly. The Lombard experience of the Social Area Plans was developed with a strong 
emphasis on planning the integration of the services network and the concerted use of the 
resources assigned by the state and regional administrations to a plurality of municipalities 
called on to jointly decide on their use. This collaborative form is called associated regulation 
and strategic orientation. 
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Therefore, two types of activity qualify the collaborative processes between the municipal 
administrations, each of which can ensure their appropriate functioning by choosing one of 
the different legal forms that regulate the opportunities and risks. In that sense, a legal form 
may or may not be appropriate for hosting a certain type of activity and may even, in a 
different way, embrace both. 
4.2 Regional measures for developing associative forms 
Lombardy has a high number of demographically small municipalities (71.2% have less than 
5000 residents, corresponding to 10.5% of the resident population). The past ten years have 
seen the Lombard Regional Administration take several steps to develop associated 
managements, believing administrative fragmentation a source of criticality that makes it 
difficult to both define effective orientation strategies and implement responses capable of 
meeting the growing needs of citizens. 
The measures to directly incentivize associative forms are implemented when a governing 
agency, in our case the regional council, takes on a commitment with the recipient 
administrations so that these adopt specific behaviours: voluntary, in relation to the 
implementation of the associated management of services; or discretionary, in the case of 
associated regulation and strategic orientation. Up to now the commitments undertaken by the 
Lombard regional administration have concretized in the transfer of financial resources, 
without considering any other forms of commitment, such as the implementation of the 
services needed to manage the local change and the possible increase of the local 
administrations’ decisional autonomy, enabling these to make decisions otherwise of regional 
competence. 
The incentive actions taken to date have aimed to develop the associated management of 
services activity according to the multiservice and the sectorial method. The former 
(multiservices) are intended to support the setting up of associative forms aimed at integrating 
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local policies in more areas of intervention in a stable way and with the desire to 
progressively expand the quantity of functions and services managed in associative form. The 
incentive sets out, firstly, to motivate the local actors by helping to reduce the costs of change 
both in the transition phases from an independent to an associated (startup) management 
system and in the development of the management changes needed to maintain and grow an 
associated management of services activity. Secondly, the incentive aims to reduce the costs 
incurred in managing the change by providing the funds to enable the provision of a broader 
range of services or the extension of the user base of existing services. 
The incentive actions related to sectorial policies support associative forms as an institutional 
and organisational tool to ensure the pursuing of the quantitative and qualitative growth 
targets of specific local community services. In the case of sectorial policy incentives, 
therefore, the public resources transferred are generally integrated with others aimed not at the 
implementation of an associative form but the growth of the local community service 
offering. 
4.3 Status of the partnerships  
Interviews with some of the Lombard public administrators involved in the associated 
management initiatives enabled us to gather a widespread consensus on the opportunity to 
collaborate with other local agencies in areas of common interest. The two reasons most 
frequently given for inducing the municipalities to join up are, above all, the desire to provide 
coordinated and coherent responses to the needs expressed by specific communities, with a 
strength not otherwise possible in a highly fragmented local scenario, and the chance to 
improve and innovate the service offering in line with the criteria of economic savings and 
quality. 
At first glance, we could say that the incentivizing actions helped to change the cognitive 
sphere of the subjects involved (Cersosimo and Wolleb, 2001): the respondents have grasped 
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the basic philosophy of the regulations and agree with their purposes. The inter-municipal 
aggregations are perceived as a new intermediate agency with the power to overcome the 
chronic difficulties suffered by, above all, the small municipalities. 
The analysis conducted in the field of whole networks implemented in Lombardy suggests an 
inconsistency between what agency respondents considered to be important for the purposes 
of an efficacious delivery of the public services and the concrete behaviours.  
The overall density of services provided in associative form is 16% of those provided directly 
by the municipalities (IReR, 2009), which means that the municipal partnerships in Lombardy 
are in the minority compared with the direct (“in-house”) management method. The Lombard 
scenario is patchy also when it comes to the size of the partnerships, the meaningfulness of 
the activities, and the quality of the projects implemented, a clear sign of the highly diverse 
capacities of the local administrations to respond to the urgings of the regulations analyzed in 
this paper.  
The IReR survey revealed that on average the Lombard municipal administrations tend to: 
- create small aggregation hubs in terms of the number and size of the participants; 
- avoid institutional relations (such as the Unioni di comuni or “Inter-authority 
Partnering Units”) that are more complex than the simple agreement for the 
management of specific activities or functions. We point out that about 60% of the 
total associative activities appoints one of the municipalities involved as the lead 
manager of the aggregation, taking into account the Strategic Board as an integral part 
of the municipal administrations; 
- change their partners in line with the theme/service involved, thus multiplying the 
overall number of associative forms (about 500) in the area. 
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Thus, Lombardy presents a highly variegated scenario of legal forms, services delivered, rules 
of functioning, and levels of integration between the participants and the governance 
mechanisms adopted for the various associative forms. 
The willingness to aggregate on an intermunicipal basis is expressed in ways and degrees that 
range – according to a continuum – from poorly structured associated management solutions 
governed and managed through agreements to highly structured solutions such as the inter-
authority partnering units. Table 1, below, shows the type and frequency of the lead agencies, 
that is, the agencies that lead a supralocal association (please refer to (IReR, 2007, 2009) for a 
detailed description of the features of the Lombard aggregation hubs).  
Table 1. Lombard Municipalities. Services provided in associative form: type of lead agency (IReR, 2009) 
Types of Aggregation Leaders % 
Municipality 52.97 
Consortium 11.53 
Joint-stock Company 9.91 
Strategic Board (Ufficio di piano) 7.75 
Inter-authority Partnering Unit 6.13 
Limited Company 3.78 
Mountain Communities 3.42 
Other 2.52 
Province 1.08 
Foundation 0.90 
Total   100.00 
 
Among the top five categories of services for which the associative management form rises to 
higher than 20%, a good four areas of intervention stand out in which the regional policies are 
oriented to promote supralocal models (see Table 2 below). These areas of intervention are: 
social services, libraries, one-stop business desks, local police. On the heels of that lead group 
come the activities related to the management of information and telecommunications 
systems at 13%. Also in this case, we are looking at an area earmarked for regional and 
national incentive plans. 
Waste management operations and the integrated water and gas cycle rank second place in the 
sphere of functions provided and managed in associative form but are not the beneficiaries of 
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incentive actions. However, these services are key to the norms that push towards the creation 
of optimal management environments aimed at producing efficiency savings. Only in rare 
cases do the associative forms implemented by the Lombard municipalities concern “internal” 
functions, such as financial, organisational, administrative and personnel management. One 
interesting exception is the information and telecommunication systems management 
function, which in terms of associative management frequency ranks immediately after the 
lead group indicated in Table 2 below.  
We advance two explanations for that. The first is that the information and telecommunication 
systems function has been the object of many national and regional incentive programs that 
have indubitably influenced the development of intermunicipal collaboration projects; the 
second, which complements the first, refers to the nature of the activities in question. Given 
the highly complex terrain and the high costs involved, the Lombard municipalities have seen 
the associative management form as a way to overcome the lack of resources and required 
professional skills. 
Table 2. Lombard Municipalities. Key functions provided in associative form (IReR, 2009) 
Functions % services provided in 
associative form 
Social services 39.20% 
Waste, water and gas management 36.00% 
Culture, libraries 30.10% 
Production businesses 25.10% 
Local police, Civil defense 24.40% 
Information and communication systems 12.80% 
Education, Right to study 12.10% 
Youth, sports, leisure policies 11.10% 
Environment   9.80% 
Private construction   8.00% 
Urban planning   7.30% 
Public works and management of State-owned assets   4.60% 
Human resources and organisation   4.10% 
Economic-financial management, taxation and asset 
management 
  3.80% 
General affairs, protocol, archive   2.60% 
Demographic and statistical services   1.30% 
 
In terms of the relationship between the associated management tendency and the size of the 
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municipality, Fig. 1 below shows the ratio of the services provided by the Lombard 
municipalities (vertical axis) and the resident population in those municipalities (horizontal 
axis). The top curve describes a directly proportional ratio between the number of inhabitants 
and the average quantity of services provided. On the other hand, the bottom curve shows the 
ratio between the services provided in associative form and the populations of the Lombard 
municipalities. In this case, the trend is inverted: when the population density of the 
municipalities is lower, the quantity of services provided in associative form grows slightly. 
That means the smaller municipalities have a (relatively) higher tendency to aggregate to offer 
joint services or functions to their citizens. 
 
Figure 1. Lombard Municipalities: services provided by population group, in total and in associative form. 
Source: Regione Lombardia, data as at June 30, 2008 
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The inter-authority partnering units (“IAPU”) are worthy of separate mention. These 
multiservice associative forms see the municipalities involved “join up” to create more robust 
and stable aggregation hubs than simple agreements. The Regione Lombardia has earmarked 
the IAPU as priority legal forms for the associated management of services. Nevertheless, 
despite the brisk growth enjoyed by the IAPU in 2000-2005 (thanks to the hefty financial 
incentives guaranteed by the State and the regional administration), the presence of these 
“second-level” units has not been enough to stem the tide of looser associative forms (e.g., 
agreements). Indeed, the IAPU are currently in the minority versus other forms of associated 
management. The services and functions mostly transferred to these units are the local police, 
protocol and general secretariat, network maintenance, administrative compliance with the 
economic treatment of personnel and taxation, school assistance, waste collection and 
disposal. Up to now, there are no cases in which the partnering municipalities have transferred 
100% of their services to the IAPU. 
The 60 IAPU in Lombardy (2009 data) are mainly composed of municipalities with a 
population of less than 2000 inhabitants (76%); 71% of these have no more than three 
participants, which leads us to conclude that the small municipalities tend to favor relations 
with “other subjects of similar size” (IReR, 2007). An earlier research (ibidem: 139) has 
underscored how the administrators of the smaller municipalities prefer to aggregate with 
their like because they fear that joining up with IAPU containing larger municipalities will 
translate into a loss of decisional autonomy and identity. We also point out that the Lombard 
IAPU have shown a low level (about +6%) of development capacity in terms of broadening 
the functions carried out after these were set up. Only a few IAPU have expanded the range of 
services and functions offered, while an even smaller number of cases, to date, have 
transferred to the IAPU (almost) the whole of the functions previously carried out by the 
municipalities. 
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5. Evaluating multi-agency implementation 
The field analysis conducted reveals a highly mixed scenario in terms of both the size of the 
aggregations and the types of projects implemented on the back of the regional programs. 
While Lombardy is not short of meaningful experiences and success stories, the fact remains 
that this region provides only 16% of services in associative form. Lombardy also has a 
higher number of IAPU than the national average, but the extreme heterogeneity of these 
subjects, in terms of both participants and the functions performed, throws up a barrier that 
prevents us from considering the IAPU as stable provincial and regional actors. As a 
consequence, the role usually assumed by these units is rarely related to local area planning 
and promotion. More often, the design capacity of the IAPU is limited to the search for 
common solutions to the simple management of basic services. 
We have also noted a significant gap between the declarations of unconditional support for 
collaboration and the effective behaviour of the majority of Lombardy’s local administrations. 
That gap reflects the diverse leanings and capacities of the policy implementers and public 
managers to launch and manage plans to strategically upgrade the local offering. 
If the evaluation were limited to these considerations, we would be facing a common sense 
judgment (termed by Lippi, 2007 as the level-zero evaluation), unproductive because it serves 
neither to understand the reasons for the results achieved nor to assess the merit of the 
regulations in question. We recall that the goal of the evaluation is to give a scientifically 
founded opinion based on the dynamics related to the decision and the implementation of a 
public program. That opinion is outside the political-administrative process and is not bound 
to any of the interested parties. It is, first and foremost, a knowledge producing method 
(ibidem: 23). That knowledge must be useful and constructive for both the policymakers and 
the public managers.  
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At which point, it might be useful to reinterpret the Lombardy case based on the conceptual 
frameworks proposed in Section 2. 
5.1 A top-down view 
The interpretation offered by the Policy Evaluation framework looks to the plurality of the 
actors involved. Because it is difficult to reach consensus between an excessive number of 
parties with vested interests and that not all the local actors were willing to invest their energy 
in this direction, the greater majority of the Lombard municipalities chose not to enter 
associative forms. That defection is a choice that shelters them from the inevitable 
information and transaction costs. 
The policy in question is based on broad yet abstract objectives, making it difficult to evaluate 
for those who must take a position, i.e. cooperate or defect, and to act accordingly. Further, 
the incentive systems are highly skewed on the inputs (especially in terms of the formal 
requisites that each partner must have), but less ambitious on the outputs, i.e. no particularly 
high standards need to be met from the organisational or design quality viewpoint to benefit 
from the contributions. The norms essentially valorise the services integration process, while 
only modestly rewarding the consolidation of the organisational structures (e.g., the setting up 
of “single offices”). 
Such a poorly selective policy will hardly attract those municipalities more open to 
innovation. These subjects are not urged to pursue new avenues or excellence, proof of which 
is the fact that most of the partnerships launched in Lombardy are so small in size they have 
been unable to achieve significant quality increases or management cost savings (IReR, 
2007). Sometimes, the Lombard municipalities have merely stipulated agreements or 
conventions (which keep the functions under the control of each local agency) for less critical 
areas (e.g., public lighting, right to study, libraries), participating simultaneously in more 
aggregations characterized by different proprietary structures and composed of different 
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partners. The hoped-for development of inter-institutional relations in other areas of 
intervention has not taken root in most cases.  
5.2 A bottom-up view 
Policy Inquiry suggests that the coalitions that support the distribution policies, i.e. those that 
provide benefits to certain social groups or local environments, are not founded on common 
interests, but on the summation of requests and on reciprocal non-interference (Regonini, 
2001). In these situations the conflict is almost completely absent (which should favor the 
adoption of collaborative behaviours), but at the same time demands an extraordinary effort 
and much coordination by the groups of actors, institutional or other, who recognize 
themselves in the goals of such policies. 
In Lombardy, it has been easy to exploit the room for manoeuvre by either remaining passive 
or, in the case of some quarrelsome recipients, raising active opposition. We cannot rule out 
that some local administrators have attempted to launch negotiating tables only to then realize 
that the cost of the associative forms of the sectorial or multiservice type would outweigh the 
expected benefits. Faced with that scenario, many municipalities have opted out. 
Then there are those municipalities whose opposition stems from “preconceived ideas” and 
who have not even evaluated the implications of the collaborative initiatives. The incentives 
and subsidies envisioned by the regulations have failed to deliver a decisive result in orienting 
the recipients’ behaviour in the direction desired by the regional policy formulators. Finally, 
we cannot exclude cases in which the setting up of associative forms is the result of collusive 
behaviours, in other words, conduct in which the collaboration is enacted solely to intercept 
public resources, paying scant attention to the effective development of the cooperation and 
its effects (Cersosimo and Wolleb, 2001).  
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5.3 An IRF-based view 
An interpretive key based on the Implementation Regime Framework (IRF) shifts the focus to 
the implementation context. In Lombardy, many local agencies coexist, each with its own 
specificities in terms of institutional architecture, socio-economic composition, geographic 
location, political leadership, and public policy experiences. 
Each implementation regime helps to shape the relations and models of interaction between 
the diverse local actors, but at the same time is influenced by the policy initiatives (Stoker, 
1989). To what extent have the Lombard incentive policies captured the importance of the 
local implementation regimes? The regulations have set standard conditions for determining, 
for instance, the eligibility of the projects and calculating the subsidy amounts, as if the local 
administrations were part of a sole integrated system, while it is well known that the capacity 
of the individual administrations to launch and manage processes of change is anything but 
uniform and, further, is full of both qualitative and quantitative asymmetries. Some scholars 
have defined this typically Italian situation as a bureaucratic divide (Morciano, 2008). It is a 
gap that segments the country and makes the implementation of public sector reform 
uncertain. Such disparities, in the last analysis, tangibly influence the quality and range of 
services enjoyed by the residents in the different locations (ibidem: 15). 
Evaluating the adequacy of the incentive policies in the local areas is not just a matter of 
merely observing the ex-post performance of the associative forms; it is crucial to compare 
the results observed with the effective possibility of the citizens and businesses to use the 
social assets and services. The way the Lombard municipalities see it – especially those 
located in physically peripheral areas – the context of application designed by the incentive 
policies must have appeared too far from the “different speed” context with which the 
agencies relate daily. Probably, most of these have not seen themselves as a potential recipient 
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of the standard intervention packages and have preferred to “sit on the fence”, at least for the 
first round. 
 
At the conceptual level, the IRF’s approach to the study of implementation distinguishes 
between the structural environment and the action environment, which mutually influence 
each other. That dual representation perceives the implementation scenario as a whole of 
properties and characteristics that dynamically order (and constrain) the practices of the 
administrations and which are influenced by these latter (the practices, editor’s note). The 
incentivizing norms provide a hypothetical development process to “regulate” subjects who 
want to explore the scope for launching collaborative forms. That regulatory level interacts 
with another, largely implicit regulatory level dictated by the contextual factors that 
distinguish the individual local organisations. The interaction between the two levels forms 
the reference area in which the individual administration places its own behaviors. The 
effective action (e.g., the choice of whether to adhere or not to an associative form; or the 
decision of which types of services to transfer to shared management) is produced through 
interaction with at least another regulatory source: the rules that immediately structure the 
decisions, the objectives, and the behaviours of the single subject in a determined context. 
Clearly, this third regulatory level can only be autonomous, that is, produced by the agent 
subject during the unfolding of the action. The concept of regulation enables us to explain the 
defection also by the very small municipalities, those that precisely due to the chronic 
deficiencies in terms of technological, professional, and financial resources would be the 
natural recipients of the incentive policies. 
The empirical investigation has enabled us to see how the inter-municipal processes in 
Lombardy unfold in a differentiated way. There are cases in which the associative choice 
happens in a previously defined local area and cases in which the local area is established by 
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the member municipalities themselves. There are also cases in which the recipients consider 
the incentive policy an important opportunity and, vice versa, in which the reactions of the 
administrations were neutral or negative. Therefore, it is the context that “makes the 
difference”. 
The IRF enables us to show how the variability of the behaviours and the persistence shown 
by the contexts, but also the possibilities of change can coexist and interconnect without 
clashing. The interpretive key that enables the coherent lining up of these diverse analytical 
levels is entrusted to the concept of regulation. Specifically, distinguishing between the 
different regulatory levels helps us to understand why it is fairly impossible that 
implementation of the same incentive norms can “impose” standard practices also in similar 
contexts. In short, it is always possible for the implementers, who retain their own sphere of 
autonomy, to re-contextualize. 
6. Implications for implementation 
Importantly, the IRF theory outlined in this article offers the policy designers and public 
managers several ideas to improve implementation. First, the IRF sees existing contexts as 
resources that can be mobilised to develop a qualified service offering also in disadvantaged 
areas. In the presence of strong local disparities and, above all, where previous collaborative 
experiences are lacking, working on joint projects is arduous because of the prevalence of 
reciprocal suspicions and vetoes among the actors: ‘mutual defection leads to policy 
stagnation’ (Stoker, 1989: 43). However, the marginality and the fragility of the local areas 
are not ineluctable. A way to overcome the disparities is to reinforce social cohesion through 
the involvement – starting with the policy design – of other local area players (e.g. companies, 
private and voluntary associations). The IRF suggests starting with the specific needs of the 
local contexts as a base for the use of the public resources, allocating these to support solely 
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projects that are truly new and high-profile. In terms of the already established associative 
forms, on the other hand, it is necessary to promote those initiatives that plan to launch 
important collaborations with other local area actors. In parallel, opportunistic behaviour 
needs to be curbed by strengthening the regulatory penalty mechanisms.  
Second, while the development of partnerships requires support (Asthana et al., 2002), 
financial incentives alone cannot be considered the main and decisive factor in changing the 
condition and/or the behaviour of the recipients of a public policy in the desired direction. The 
emphasis on the context suggests that continuative and qualified support actions aimed at the 
local areas are necessary in order not to leave the local administrators alone to tackle the 
challenges of change. A recent study (IReR, 2007) underscores how the setting up of the 
IAPU is an arena of “institutional experimentation” (ibidem: 169) that not all local 
administrators seem able to face. The joint provision of services implies the enactment of new 
work distribution processes, new routines, and an effort to restructure duties, tasks, and 
functions, as well as operational and management responsibilities. It imposes integration 
strategies of the organisational and structural type and the sharing of technical, professional 
and economic resources. The public contributions (financial or in the form of consulting 
services) envisioned by the incentive systems can ease the economic issue, above all, in the 
startup phase of the associative structures, but certainly do not resolve the problem of the 
insufficient capacity to govern the associated management processes. 
Therefore, the implementation of partnerships must be transformed into a process of 
collective learning, in which the region acts as an ‘animateur’ (Diez, 2002). Incentives and 
“animation” must mutually strengthen each other with the objective of progressively 
developing the local administrations’ ability to collaborate at all levels. Indeed, the IRF 
suggests that while defection is most attractive in the initial stages of the implementation 
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process, conversely, the likelihood of cooperation and mutual adaptation tends to grow over 
time (Stoker, 1989).  
In brief, the IRF indicates two ways to make the policies in question more efficacious and 
incisive, i.e. i) higher contextualization and selectivity of the projects to fund; and ii) 
structured and continuing support by the Regione to “accompany” the setting up and 
consolidation of the associative forms. Interestingly, this dual action of reconfiguring the 
incentive logics and mechanisms could translate into the strengthening of a dimension in 
which the Regione Lombardia has shown little interest up to now: the evaluation of the 
projects it has itself funded. 
In their seminal study, Pressman and Wildawsky (1984: xv) said that implementation and 
evaluation are complementary: ‘implementation and evaluation are the opposite sides of the 
same coin, implementation providing the experience that evaluation interrogates and 
evaluation providing the intelligence to make sense of what is happening’. The only form of 
evaluation carried out to date by the Regione Lombardia has been limited to the control of the 
accounting reports and the correctness of the administrative procedures followed by the 
subsidy recipients. The regional regulations do not encourage the stringent monitoring of the 
outcomes and the impacts of the programs, making it tough to track and evaluate the projects 
funded. 
In light of what we have said earlier on the uncertainty and ambiguity of implementation 
processes, it would be simplistic to say that more incisive norms can reduce the irrepressible 
criticality of such processes. But it is not unrealistic to assume that the appreciation of the 
policy results becomes more practicable when the norms are not limited to stating the value 
principles, but rather set the goals as a range of indicators to be observed. That would make it 
easier to distinguish between the projects or the aggregations that respond solely to the formal 
requisites and the collaborative initiatives that offer concrete responses in terms of substance. 
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More generally, having a dedicated information base on which to ground decisions could 
accrete the policy planners’ capacity for analysis, in view, for example, of the re-proposal or 
the modification of the public programs. 
7. Conclusions 
This article claims the usefulness of adopting an implementation analysis approach that draws 
on Organisation Theory and which also is highly interesting from the heuristic perspective. 
The general picture produced by the local agency partnerships in Lombardy enables us to 
highlight contextual aspects that can hinder or facilitate the successful implementation of 
incentive policies. At this stage in the research, we can therefore advance only a preliminary 
response to our research questions.  
 
1) Has the promotion of intermunicipal arrangements increased collaboration among public 
administrations? 
The empirical evidence indicates it has increased collaborative efforts in terms of some 
outcomes, e.g., the number of associated management experiences launched in the past few 
years, the quantity of services transferred by the municipalities. Nevertheless, the evolution of 
these forms is obviously still too slow. The empirical data show that councils in Lombardy 
still favour ‘self-sufficiency rather than joint working in terms of their form of organisation’ 
(Tomkinson, 2007). The average size of the aggregations make it hard to improve their 
performance in terms of economies of scale. In addition, the municipal authorities are 
reluctant to form associations to jointly manage the more “internal” functions (e.g., related to 
local area management or financial management). The decision not to adhere can be 
interpreted as the local administrations’ attempt to save spheres of activity in which room for 
autonomy prevails from new forms of external regulation. 
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2) Is it possible to perform a network evaluation outside the policymaking arena, i.e. an 
evaluation not influenced by vested party interests? 
Our research, even though exploratory, suggests that a level-two evaluation is impractical at 
present, above all, because we are unable to verify the impacts on the ultimate targets. Earlier 
research and data collected for the IReR 2009 study are not sufficient to conduct an evaluation 
from a perspective that is – we reiterate – outside the policymaking arena on whether 
something has changed between the initial problem-situation (e.g., highly fragmented 
administration, inadequacy of the responses to public needs, local area asymmetries) and the 
end result, nor if this change is attributable to the policy analyzed or other causes. We note 
that the absence of an information system dedicated to associated management forms makes it 
impractical for the policy planner – in our case, the Regione Lombardia – to systematically 
monitor the effects of the financed programs. The unevenness of the associated management 
forms in the region’s diverse areas enables us to capture the weighting of the contextual 
factors only in an abstract and summary way, but not to investigate why the gap has emerged. 
To track the impacts generated by the incentive policies on the citizens and businesses of the 
diverse areas requires structured databases along with information that can give a picture of 
the multidimensional phenomenon, such as the bureaucratic divide. On which topic, to the 
authors’ knowledge, no consolidated literature exists. 
 
The IRF seems to offer an adequate interpretive key to respond to the underlying need of the 
evaluation – in turn, meant as a process of action – which is: to interpret and explain the real 
situation and – in tandem – intervene in that same environment to orient the process towards 
more satisfying results. 
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In the field of public policies, the possibility that the intentions of the legislator remain on 
paper is anything but improbable. We have noted that the highly heterogeneous areas with 
broad economic and social gaps combined with the regulatory limits of the incentive systems 
can favour collusive and opportunistic behaviour. Therefore, future incentive programs that 
fail to define explicit strategies of accompaniment and animation, aimed at preventing the 
factors that feed the bureaucratic divide, are bound inevitably to flounder or, in the best-case 
scenario, lead to an inorganic and differentiated implementation, resulting in the waste of 
funds and further emphasizing the highly fragmented administrative and institutional 
landscape. The IRF invites us to consider the actors’ exercising of discretion as something 
ineluctable, something that not even the most stringent regulations can eliminate. 
Several aspects of this research need further investigation and study. First, we need to dig 
deeper into the individual experiences; only a longitudinal analysis of each network can help 
us to understand what in a program makes it function (or not) for some contexts and not for 
others. Second, we need to monitor the overall temporal sustainability of the associative 
management forms. The developments of the intermunicipal agreements must be tracked over 
a longer period of time before it can be safely concluded that a major transition to the network 
form is occurring rather than tactical compliance with a new set of central initiatives (Ferlie 
and Pettigrew, 1996). Finally, it would be interesting to compare the Lombard experience 
with those of other Italian regions. 
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